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ABSTRACT  
Extant literature characterizes the ties between buyers and sellers in online goods marketplaces–such as EBay or Amazon–as 
"arm's length" relationships.  In such relationships, parties are effectively strangers, and exchange goods under the 
assumption that they will likely never again meet in the marketplace.  The rapid rise of online service marketplaces, however, 
warrants a thorough examination into the applicability of these conclusions to buyer-seller relationships in the nascent 
markets.  In this work-in-progress, we hypothesize that buyer activity in the marketplace will consist initially of "service 
encounters" whereby the uncommitted or inexperienced buyer gains exposure to a large number of potential suppliers.  
Increased experience in and reliance upon the market, we predict, will lead to a convergence towards "service relationships" 
as buyers seek trust, reduced risk, and close partnerships through repeated exchanges with a small set of suppliers.  We intend 
to test this learning curve hypothesis using data collected from a leading online job auction site.  The results will shed new 
light on the nature of buyer-seller relationships in online service-exchange markets. 
Keywords  
Online service markets, service relationships, buyer-supplier relations, IS outsourcing, repeat business 
INTRODUCTION 
Online service marketplaces provide service providers and clients with an excellent tool to find jobs and professional services 
from all around the world. Job auction Web sites have become increasingly popular during the past five years among small 
business owners who want to outsource small Information Technology (IT), marketing, accounting, writing, translation, or 
legal projects to service providers from the U.S., India, Russia, and many European countries. A list of popular sites would 
include: elance.com, rentacoder.com, guru.com, smarterwork.com, oDesk.com, getafreelancer.com, sologig.com, and 
snaajab.com. Clients on job auction sites are often small businesses (Radkevitch, Heck and Koppius 2006) or individuals who 
post auctions describing the project requirements in a form of request for proposal (RFP). Service providers, comprised of 
small providers and individual freelancers, prepare a bid package indicating their capabilities, delivery time, price, and other 
relevant documents to compete for projects. User demographics lead to a high concentration of small-sized projects.  The 
average bid price for IT projects used in Kim (2009) and this work are $955 and $1,210, respectively.  The winner is selected 
through a reverse auction mechanism, but the lowest bid price may not necessarily win due to non-price attributes–provider 
qualification and reputation, delivery time, etc–affecting the client’s utility function (Kim 2009).  The combination of an 
online marketplace with a reverse auction maximizes competition among bidders and enables firms to efficiently outsource 
small-scale IT projects and other professional services, offering lower costs and improved profitability achieved via reduced 
transaction costs (Kim 2009; Snir and Hitt 2003). 
Recently, massive layoffs due to the current financial collapse drew a sudden rise in media and public attention to these 
marketplaces (CBS5News 2008; Flandez 2008; FoxNews 2009; Stern 2009). As about 2.5 million full-time jobs have been 
lost in 2008 and early 2009, job auction sites have observed a soaring number of professionals who join looking for part-time 
jobs. On the buyer side, companies seeking to cut budgets can look online for low-cost providers who allow buyers to pay for 
only what they need through customized outsourcing (Stern 2009). The recent concept of acquiring a virtual assistant refers 
to the practice of outsourcing simple or tedious tasks to highly specialized, remote personnel employed elsewhere.  This 
behavior seeks economies of scale using the job auction sites; clients free up time to concentrate on their core business by 
relegating data entry, market research, calendar management, etc. at a much lower rate than they would incur doing such 
tasks themselves or hiring a more traditional personal assistant. 
Despite the growing use of online service marketplaces, the buyer-supplier relationships that form in the market have not 
been studied. Snir and Hitt (2003) and Carr (2003) study the costs involved in evaluating and placing bids in online markets 
for IT services. Radkevitch et al. (2006) examine small firms’ offshore outsourcing activities. Kim, Altinkemer and Bisi 
(2009) propose a revenue management model for IT service providers by which an IT service firm dynamically sources 
projects from online markets to utilize temporarily idle developers.  Kim (2009) empirically tests determinants of vendor 
selection for IT projects. 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of the relationships between suppliers and clients who exchange services 
online. While inter-firm relationships when both parties have to invest in interorganizational systems, such as EDI or supply 
chain systems, have been studied (Bensaou 1997; Clemons, Reddi and Row 1993), the buyer-supplier relationship in these is 
different from the one we are examining in this work. The distinction is drawn because neither buyers nor sellers on an online 
job auction site need invest a significant amount of capital or efforts towards building a relationship-specific system or 
infrastructure - it is provided for them - and they incur relatively marginal costs to join the marketplace. 
 
THEORETICAL BASIS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
We have chosen to focus on outsourcing IT services because the intangible and customizable nature of IT products represents 
the typical characteristics of a service. This implies information asymmetries between the parties, which represents a crucial 
distinction from relationships in physical goods markets. 
Transaction cost theorists have argued that advances in information technology (IT) lead to the development of electronic 
markets, as opposed to electronic hierarchies (Malone, Yates and Benjamin 1987). Buyers in markets choose the best 
products and services after comparing many available suppliers whereas in hierarchies, they simply work with a single 
supplier or small set of suppliers who are predetermined by managerial decision (Malone et al. 1987). Electronic markets 
reduce coordination costs, provide buyers a wide variety of options, reduce transaction risk by providing effective monitoring 
tools, and create tighter activity coordination between buyers and suppliers (Clemons et al. 1993; Grover, Teng and Fiedler 
2002; Malone et al. 1987). Buyers join the market to access a tremendous array of skilled professionals. They create auctions, 
evaluate bid packages, and ultimately choose a winner from among the many suppliers. Price and terms are determined for 
each transaction individually, as opposed to being a prearranged condition. Furthermore, outsourcing service projects 
requires high coordination costs involved in searching for potential suppliers, contracting, negotiating, communicating, 
exchanging information, and protecting from opportunistic behavior of suppliers. Therefore, service outsourcing is especially 
well suited in electronic markets which reduce such coordination costs (Clemons et al. 1993; Malone et al. 1987).   
Electronic markets are characterized by impersonal, arm’s length relationships in which the buyers and sellers assume short-
term relationships (Schultze and Orlikowski 2004). A number of studies (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Dellarocas 2005; Pavlou and 
Gefen 2004) have indicated that buyers transact primarily with unknown sellers, and have a low probability of encountering 
them again. Resnick and Zechauser (2002) collected data from eBay that show close to 90% of the encounters during a five-
month period were one-shot. This explains the prevalence and necessity of systematized client reputations (via “feedback” or 
ratings), which replace traditional word of mouth, mitigating moral hazard problems common to transactions among 
strangers (Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels 2004). 
However, these previous studies focus on transaction cost economics and arm’s length relationships in electronic markets for 
physical goods and do not address client-supplier relationships in service markets. Service exchange is in nature significantly 
different from exchange of physical goods. It involves exchange of intangible products which cannot be precisely described 
until the exchange is complete. It requires a greater degree of communication, coordination, and information sharing in the 
buyer-supplier dyad. We argue the client-supplier relationships in online service marketplace are significantly different from 
arm’s length relationships, despite the fact that the marketplace is built around a vast pool of strangers.  
We leverage organizational theory to explain the properties of the client-supplier relationship. Organizational theory suggests 
that embedded relationship is the key factor in success of interorganizational exchanges (Uzzi 1997; Uzzi 1999).  Embedded 
relationships are characterized by recurrent exchange, expectation of interdependence, goodwill, mutual trust, and sharing 
information. Contrast this with arm’s length relationships which assume nonrecurring interactions, independence, self-
interest, and opportunism (Uzzi 1997). Utilizing a similar concept but with a focus on service exchange, Gutek (1995) 
categorizes relationships with service providers into three groups: service encounters, pseudo-relationships, and service 
relationships. A service encounter is a service delivery strategy whereby customers and supplier assume one-time interaction 
and therefore is linked to arm’s length relationship. Pseudo-relationship is related to mass production of services in modern 
society. Customers in pseudo-relationships interact with the same service organization but it does not guarantee they will 
have the same provider each time. Customers in service relationships expect repeat business in the future with the same 
service provider with intention of establishing embedded relationship.  Repeated interactions between buyer and seller in 
relationships facilitate trust development but one-time interactions between strangers in encounters do not (Gutek, Cherry, 
Bhappu and Woolf 2000).  
An increasing body of the IS literature examine the impact of IT on the buyer-supplier relationship from the relationalism 
perspective to complement the view from the transaction theory in forms of case study (Bhappu and Schultze 2006; Schultze 
2004; Schultze et al. 2004; Standing, Stockdale and Love 2007) and survey research (Bensaou 1997; Clemons et al. 1993). In 
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the “Move to the Middle” hypothesis, Clemons et al. (1993) agree with the transaction cost view in that reduced transaction 
costs by IT makes outsourcing activities more attracted but also complement it with the relationalism view arguing that IT 
also leads firms to form a closer coordination with a small set of suppliers. Grover et al. (2002) content IT moderates the 
negative relationship between transaction costs and relationalism. Schultze and Orlikowski (2004) conduct a field study and 
discover that using IT within interfirm relations makes it difficult for sales representatives to build and maintain embedded 
relationships with their customers. The complementary view of transaction cost theory and relationalism is extended in 
Standing et al. (2007) where a hybrid model of buyer-supplier relationships, a local community concept within a market 
based mechanism, is examined. 
We calibrate such complementing views on the impact of IT on buyer-supplier relationship. Certainly the benefits of 
electronic market, such as reduced coordination costs and huge number of options available, are the driving force attracting 
many buyers and suppliers in online service marketplaces. Buyers will enjoy such benefits when they first join the market. 
However, as the organizational theory suggests, buyers who are committed to the market will realized the benefits of service 
relationships. Therefore, we argue that the firms in online outsourcing marketplaces initially explore and enjoy the benefit of 
markets but eventually converge to the middle seeking for long-term relationship and partnership. This argument involves 
two distinct dimensions of buyer-supplier ties: breadth and depth. Clients initially explore wide swaths of electronic markets, 
thus exhibiting diverse provider selection, i.e., expanding breadth of ties.  As the client's experience increases, s/he seeks 
recurring transactions with a small set of providers, i.e., developing depth of ties and limiting breadth. The development of 
breadth of relationship resembles a learning curve which has a decreasing slope. Depth of relationship is developed in an 
accelerated rate since buyers focus on a small set of providers as their experience with the market matures. The associated 
hypotheses are developed as below and also illustrated in Figure 1.  
Hypothesis 1a: Clients initially expand breadth of relationships but, as the client’s experience with the market 
increases, the growth rate of the breadth will decrease. 
Hypothesis 2a: As the client’s experience increases, the growth rate of depth of relationships will increase. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of hypotheses 1a and 2a 
 
The above view can be extended to examine the impact of an interesting market parameter currently operated in many job 
auction sites. Buyers on the sites have an option to solicit a private auction, instead of a public auction, in which only invited 
service providers can participate in bidding. Inviting particular providers to a private auction indicates the buyer’s explicit 
commitment to the relationships with the selected providers. The providers can also interpret the invitation as a reliable signal 
for close partnership and potential long-term relationship. Initiating an invite-only auction and responding an invitation 
accelerate mutual trust and partnership. Hence, we hypothesize the market parameter indicating buyer’s explicit intention for 
partnership positively contributes to the convergence towards a small set of suppliers. 
Hypothesis 1b: A client’s breadth of relationship is negatively related with the use of invite-only auctions in the past. 
Hypothesis 2b: A client’s depth of relationship is positively related with the use of invite-only auctions in the past. 
A stream of customer services literature examines how service organizations develop sustainable, long-term, trusting 
relationships with clients (Bettencourt, Gwinner and Meuter 2001; Webber and Klimoski 2004). Clients develop trust and 
loyalty when the supplier goes beyond simply completing the contract terms and demonstrates genuine care, extra effort, and 
truthful concerns to clients (Webber and Klimoski 2004). Such behaviors of goodwill are known as service-oriented 
organizational citizen behaviors (OCBs). Bowen, Gilliland and Folger (1999) identify five elements of OCBs: altruism, 
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courtesy, sportsmanship, compliance, and civic virtue. Service-oriented OCBs are very important in trust-building (Webber 
and Klimoski 2004). It is especially true in low-trust situations, such as exchanges in online markets. Cognitively, supplier’s 
OCBs are considered as role requirements in service research (Bettencourt et al. 2001). In IT outsourcing, dedicated project 
staffing, effective knowledge transfer and investing time in building a good relationship with client are perceived by clients 
as a supplier’s obligation (Koh, Ang and Straub 2004).  
On job auction sites, there are providers with large numbers of employees (over 100); we argue that such OCBs can be 
achieved easier by smaller providers. Although large service providers leverage economies of scale and perform tasks in an 
efficient way, it is more difficult for them to provide personal care and voluntary goodwill beyond the contract. They follow 
codes and standards which ensure the quality of their products but also limit customer service. In addition, they usually have 
project managers who assign incoming projects to teams of employees. Therefore clients often communicate through the 
manager, not directly with developers. It is not guaranteed whether clients will have the same developer if they use the same 
organization in the future, which creates a pseudo-relationship (Gutek 1995). Such internal hierarchies in large service 
organizations go against some client’s intention to develop a partnership and get benefits of customized outsourcing through 
online markets. On the other hand, individual freelancers are more flexible, and can more easily engage in OCBs 
communicating at their clients’ convenience, and collaborate in problem-solving. With this flexibility, however comes an 
initially high risk of opportunism. Therefore we argue that the repeat business is related to the service provider’s size once 
clients explore the pool of service providers in the market and identify appropriate partners for recurrent transactions. 
Hypothesis 1c: The small-size service providers have a negative moderating effect on the breadth of relationship. 
Hypothesis 2c: The small-size service providers have a positive moderating effect on the depth of relationship. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data 
A large set of data was collected from one of the largest job-auction Web sites. The site maintains about 25,000 jobs posted 
per month and 77,000 active professionals. We started with 31,879 projects posted in the Web & Programming category 
between July 1, 2008 and November 25, 2008. The Web & Programming category includes all IT-related sub-categories such 
as Website design/programming, blog programming, software application, mobile application, search engine optimization, 
database development, flash animation, system administration, technical support, project management, user experience 
design, and testing.  We chose the Web & Programming category among the many project categories such as marketing, 
writing, and accounting because it is one of the most populated categories in the site. By limiting our scope to a single project 
category, we can eliminate bias caused by buyers who have outsourced multiple projects across various categories. For 
example, if a buyer has posted three projects, which require Web programming, contents writing, and graphic design, 
respectively, the buyer has no choice other than selecting three different providers who specialize in the corresponding fields, 
regardless of the buyer’s possible intention to do recurrent business with a provider. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Projects Data 
 Min Max Average 
Date when a buyer joined the market 9/1/1999 11/1/2008 11/26/2006 
Buyer’s age in the market as of the current project 0 days 3337 days 758.69 days 
Average bid amount of the current project $1 $129,125 $705.34 
Average cumulative purchase amount as of the current project $0 $3,337 $7898.18 
Number of bids of the current project 1 103 8.01 
Cumulative number of projects posted as of the current project 1 209 11.88 
Cumulative number of unique vendors as of the current project 1 111 6.24 
 
From the initial data set, we identified 6,539 recently active, unique clients who have awarded more than one projects in the 
category during the above period. Since buyers can opt not to award the project if they do not find an appropriate supplier, we 
eliminated the projects that were not awarded. Client information includes the date a client joined the market, total number of 
projects posted in the category, and total dollar amount purchased. Then, we tracked these clients’ complete transaction 
history in the Web & Programming category for their entire tenure in the market. Total number of transactions in the final 
Kim et al.   Buyer-Supplier Interactions in Online Service Marketplaces 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 5 
data set is 27,569. For each client, all projects they posted and the associated bid information are collected. Project 
information includes project’s posted date, average bid amount, awarded bid amount, and awarded supplier. The overall 
average bid price in the data is $705.34. The awarded supplier information includes feedback rating, total number of reviews 
received, total revenue earned, and number of employees. Descriptive statistics of data is briefly summarized in Table 1.  
Variables and Models 
The unit of analysis is individual transactions per buyer. To test hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, the dependent variable, breadth of 
relationship ij  is defined as the cumulative number of unique providers for buyer i when the buyer makes transaction j.  We 
employ a log-linear form of the learning curve model, as in Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondson (2001), to test the decreasing 
rate of increase in the number of unique providers.  The number of unique suppliers initially increases over time as the client 
explores the market, followed by an eventual slowdown to a small set of suppliers. The analysis model is given as follows:  
ln(Breadth of relationship ij )  
= α + 0β ln(Cumulative transaction volume ij ) + 1β ln(Cumulative number of invite-only auctions ij ) 
+ 2β ln(Cumulative transaction volume ij ) * ln(Average provider size ij )  
+ 3β  ln(Cumulative number of invite-only auctions)* ln(Average provider size ij ) + i je  
To test hypothesis 1a, we operationalize the first independent variable, cumulative transaction volume ij , as the cumulative 
number of transactions of buyer i when making transaction j. Hypothesis 1b is tested by the second independent variable, 
Cumulative number of invite-only auctions ij , which is obtained by total number of invite-only auctions posted by buyer i by 
the time of transaction j. For hypothesis 1c, we introduce the interaction terms to test the negatively moderating effect of the 
use of small size providers on the total number of unique providers.  The variable used in interaction terms, average provider 
size ij , is the average size of all providers whom buyer i had transactions with until the buyer makes transaction j.  Provider 
size is measured by average number of employees in a service organization. We expect the coefficient 0β to be between 0 
and 1 so the growth in cumulative number of unique providers approaches an asymptote as in Figure 1. Similarly, for 
hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, we define another dependent variable, depth of relationship ij , as the cumulative number of repeat 
transactions the given buyer i had with previous vendors by the time of the current transaction j. The model is specified in 
below. The coefficients are expected to be positive so the growth rate of depth is increasing as the values of independent 
variables increase as in Figure 1. We expect the coefficient 0γ to be greater than 1 so the number of repeat businesses grows 
exponentially as in Figure 1. 
ln(Depth of relationship ij )  
= ϕ + 0γ ln(Cumulative transaction volume ij ) + 1γ ln(Cumulative number of invite-only auctions ij ) 
+ 2γ ln(Cumulative transaction volume ij ) * ln(Average provider size ij )  
+ 3γ  ln(Cumulative number of invite-only auctions)* ln(Average provider size ij ) + i je  
In addition, transaction amount of the current transaction and buyer age in the market at the time of the current transaction are 
included in the above models as a control variable. Another control variable is a vector of variables indicating cumulative 
numbers of transactions within the sub-category to which the current transaction belongs. These variables controlling buyer 
experience in categories have values only if the current transaction belongs to the category. Otherwise the value is zero. 
 
PRELIMINARY RESUTS 
We report regression results of hypotheses 1a and 2a only in this proceeding paper due to the incompleteness of data 
cleansing for Provider-Size and Invite–Only fields. The estimated parameters are summarized in Table 2. The result indicates 
that the number of unique vendors increase but approaches to asymptote as buyer experience measured in cumulative 
transaction volume grow. The parameter 0β is 0.741 which is less than 1, as we predicted the shape of curves in Figure 1. 
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The estimates for hypothesis 2a indicate that the cumulative number of repeat purchases increases exponentially as the buyer 
experience measured in transaction volume increases. The estimated value of the corresponding parameter 0γ is 4.315 which 
is greater than 1. The control variables, Average bid amount and Buyer age, appear to impact both breadth and depth of 
relationship.  
Table 2. Preliminary Results 
Variables Hypothesis 1a Hypothesis 2a 
Dependent variable ln(Breadth of 
relationship ij ) 
ln(Depth of 
relationship ij ) 
Intercept -0.323*** -9.226*** 
ln(Cumulative transaction volume ij ) 0.741*** 4.315*** 
ln(Average bid amount ij ) -0.011*** 0.072*** 
ln(Buyer age ij  ) 0.076*** -0.357*** 
ln(Transaction volume in the Web Site Development category ij ) -0.097*** 0.065* 
ln(Transaction volume in the Software Application category ij ) 0.030*** -0.277*** 
ln(Transaction volume in the Flash & Script category ij ) -0.158*** -0.099 
ln(Transaction volume in the Wireless & Mobile category ij ) 0.020 1.392* 
ln(Transaction volume in the Database category ij ) -0.134*** 0.477** 
R2 0.801 0.597 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
DISCUSSIONS 
The Internet provides an excellent tool to overcome the physical, geographical, and spatial limitations of buyer-supplier 
interactions that otherwise would have obstructed the exchange activities (Bensaou 1997). Online marketplaces become a 
very popular means by which buyers and sellers find one another and interact with reduced coordination costs. The crowd of 
strangers has led to the concentration of arm’s length relationships in online markets for physical goods (Ba and Pavlou 2002; 
Dellarocas 2005). Contrary to what the online market literature has observed and predicted (Malone 1998), we hypothesize 
that the digitized marketplace provides a useful tool but does not alter the way buyers and suppliers interact with each other 
significantly in service exchanges over the long term. We argue that buyers enjoy service encounters in their early experience 
of the market but converge to service relationships as their experience matures. The result will fill in the gap in the electronic 
market literature shedding light on the relatively less understood client-supplier relations in online service markets. As the 
results indicate that hypotheses 1a and 2a are supported, the implication of the result will have a significant impact on the 
literature: the client-supplier behavior is explained from the complementary view of transaction cost theory and service 
relationships.  The timing of the research is appropriate given the growing popularity of job auction sites. Site managers can 
learn from the results how buyers and professionals interact on their sites and develop adequate tools to support such 
interactions.   
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